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Abstract
We study how campaign contributions affect the voting strategies and effectiveness
of justices in the Supreme Court of eight US states. A judge’s voting strategy leans
more heavily towards an interest group the larger are its contributions to the judge,
and the smaller are its contributions to other members of the court. This indirect
effect is consistent with an equilibrium adjustment to contributions to other members
of the court. Observed contributions have a large effect on the behavior of individual
judges – affecting both the probability that they vote to overturn a decision of the
lower court and the probability that they support an incorrect decision – but they
have a small effect on the decisions and effectiveness of the Court.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that campaign contributions are a key component in the election of politi-
cians. Perhaps less known is that money has also become a central element in the selection
and retention of judges in the high courts of the United States. The goal of this paper is
to understand how private money affects public decisions in the court.
In contrast with the United States Supreme Court (whose members are appointed by
the President with consent of the Senate), more than three quarters of all US states give
voters a direct say over the selection and/or retention of judges to their high courts. In
twenty two states voters choose members of their Supreme Court in competitive elections,
and in another sixteen states voters choose whether to retain incumbents in up-or-down
retention elections. And while in the past these judicial elections were low key events, in the
last two decades they have become much more similar to their counterparts for legislative
and executive seats.
The cases of Pennsylvania and Alabama highlight the extent to which campaign con-
tributions have become central to the election of judges. The average contribution cost per
seat in the nine contests for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court between 1993-2009 totaled
3.5M. In Alabama there were twenty seven races for Supreme Court positions between
1994 and 2010, with an average contribution cost per race of 2.25M. The mark was close
to or above one million per seat in Ohio (25 races between 1992-2010 at 1.4 M per race),
Texas (33 races between 1992-2010 at 1.2M per race), Michigan (21 races between 1990 and
2010 at 1.1M per race) and Louisiana (17 races between 1992 and 2010 at 0.9M per race).
These numbers are still shy compared to the magnitude of contributions to gubernatorial
elections, but they are well above the contributions per seat in most states’ assemblies and
senates.
The ascent of money in judicial campaigns has become a source of concern for a wide
range of interests in society, from media to judges, lawyers, businesses and voters. The
generalized perception is that “state courts are drowning in a sea of special-interest cam-
paign money.” (New York Times editorial, Sept. 7, 2008). In the words of Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, “judicial elections are becoming political prizefights where partisans and
special interests seek to install judges who will answer to them instead of the law and the
Constitution.” The underlying fear is that money can now influence (either directly, or
through the selection of friendly judges) the decisions of many of the high courts in the
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U.S. This fear is shared by voters, business leaders, and the judges themselves. Accord-
ing to a 2001 national poll, 76% of voters believe campaign contributions affect a judge’s
courtroom decisions, and more than 35 % Supreme Court judges say campaign contribu-
tions have “some” or “a great deal” of influence on (presumably other) judges’ decisions.1
A 2007 survey of business by Zogby revealed that 79 % of business leaders believe that
campaign contributions made to judges have at least some influence on their decisions in
the courtroom.
Clearly, money has become an important factor in judicial politics. But how has money
affected judicial outcomes? In this paper, we study how the contributions to a given judge
by different interest groups (business, unions, lawyers, and educational organizations) affect
the voting behavior of elected judges and the decisions of the court.2
Money can affect decision-making strategies in two ways: directly, by changing the bias
and competence of the judges sitting in the court, and indirectly, by inducing a strategic
response to the strategies of other members of the court. Our first goal is to separate and
quantify the direct and indirect channels through which money affects justices’ decisions.
Do voting strategies change with campaign contributions? Do justices respond strategically
to contributions to other members of the court? Our second goal is to evaluate the effect of
contributions on the effectiveness of the court. Does money lead to a larger probability of
incorrect collective decisions at the court level? To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to quantify the direct and equilibrium impact of contributions on individual decisions
and collective outcomes.
To answer these questions, we structurally estimate a model of collective decision-
making in the court. The structural estimation approach allows us to disentangle the
effects of money on justices’ inherent preferences and characteristics, and to separate the
direct and equilibrium effects of money on their voting strategies. In particular, we recover
1The Justice at Stake survey polled 188 Supreme Court justices, 527 appellate court judges, and 1713
lower court judges. 35% of Supreme Court Justices and Appeals courts judges said that campaign con-
tributions have “some” or “a great deal” of influence on (presumably other) judges’ decisions. Moreover,
only 28% of Supreme Court justices and 32% of Appeals courts judges said that campaign contributions
have no influence on judges’ decisions.
2Differently than in other public offices, justices have to justify the reasoning behind their decisions.
Because of this, similar legal positions across industries or parties’ types will naturally be associated with
similar decisions by the same justice. As a result, the aggregate contributions of an interest group – as
opposed to the contributions of the particular parties to a given case – can potentially impact the general
position taken by a particular justice on a set of legal issues.
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justices’ types and equilibrium strategies conditional on a large number of observable char-
acteristics of the cases and the justices, including experience variables (prior judicial and
political experience, experience in the state supreme court), context variables (measures of
the political preferences of voters and politicians at the time of appointment and at the
time of decision), and contributions to each judge by interest groups aligned with the sides
in each case.3
We operationalize the concept of contributions through the money slant of a judge
in a given case. We define the money slant as the difference between the proportion of
contributions to the judge coming from interest groups favoring overturning and upholding
the decision of the lower court.
Our results show that money affects decisions in the court both directly and indirectly.
First, we find that a judge’s voting strategy leans more heavily towards an interest group
the larger are the IG’s contributions to the judge. (Moreover, this effect is stronger as
the end of term gets closer.) But we also find that a judge’s voting strategy leans more
heavily towards an interest group the smaller are its contributions to other members of
the court. This panel effect of contributions is consistent with an equilibrium adjustment
to the response of other members of the court.
To quantify the effect of contributions on collective court decisions, we compute the
effect of changing the money slant on the probability that each justice votes to overturn.
In particular, we vary the money slant of each justice i from zero to i’s average money slant
in cases in which overturning favors lawyers and upholding favors business (we refer to
this as the benchmark money slant). Three major conclusions emerge. First, contributions
have a large effect on the behavior of individual justices. In Louisiana, for example, three
justices are more than 10% more likely to overturn with the benchmark money slant than
in the absence of contributions, while one justice is more than 20% more likely to uphold
3The recovered estimates of the effect of money on bias and quality of information reflect the total long-
run effect of campaign contributions. This bundles a short-run incentive effect, by which judges sitting
in the court adapt their behavior to increase the contributions they expect to receive, and a long-run
selection effect operating through replacement (here individual judges do not accommodate their decisions
to contributions, but lobbies increase the probability that like-minded candidates win the election by
contributing to their campaign). Indeed, our focus on measuring the effects of money on the parameters
describing justices’ preferences and information differs from that of a number of existing papers, which
focus on measuring the causal effects of campaign contributions on the voting behavior of elected officials.
The objective here instead is to peer inside the “black box” of the causal effects, in order to uncover how
money affects the type and behavior of justices within an equilibrium model of committee voting.
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relative to the no-contributions benchmark. Second, the equilibrium effect is generally
relevant, and in several courts makes a substantial contribution to the total change in the
probability of overturning. Third, we find that while contributions have a relatively large
effect on the vote of individual justices, these individual effects typically counteract each
other at the court level. Only in two cases we find a non-negligible effect of contributions at
the court level. In Louisiana and Texas the court is 2.6% and 1.6% more likely to overturn
with the benchmark money slant than in the absence of contributions.
Our second goal is to evaluate how money affects the effectiveness of the court. To
do this we quantify the effect of contributions on the probability of reaching an incorrect
decision. In particular, we compute the effect of changing the money slant (from zero to
the benchmark) on the probability of incorrectly overturning and upholding the decision
of the lower court. The results highlight the differences between the response of individual
justices and that of the court, as a collective body. While in all eight states money signifi-
cantly changes the probability of mistakes by some members of the court, the influence at
the individual level doesn’t translate to influence at the level of the court. We find that in
all states money increases the probability that the court reaches an incorrect decision, but
the effect is generally small in magnitude.4 The exceptions are Louisiana (2.6%) and Texas
(1.6%). That these numbers are almost identical to the effect of the benchmark money
slant on the probability of overturning indicates that the larger probability of overturning
in the benchmark is almost entirely driven by a larger probability of incorrectly overturning
decisions that should be upheld. Thus contributions work, on average, towards promoting
mistakes, rather than rectifying mistakes from previous decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation with
the literature. Section 3 presents the model of decision-making in the court. Section 4
describes the data and specification of the empirical model. Section 5 presents the main
results, and Section 6 concludes. Section 7.3 in the Appendix describes the estimation
method employed in this paper.
4Two mechanisms attenuate the effect on individual errors. First, as we noted before, influence is not
uniform. Instead, different justices within the same court are influenced by opposing interests. Second, the
court as a collective body is “wiser” than each of its individual components.
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2 Related Literature
The main focus of our paper is on how campaign contributions affect the type and behavior
of justices sitting in the court. As such, this paper builds on the literature that studies
how elected judges in particular, and elected officials in general, respond to changes in the
political environment.
First, a number of recent papers show that elected judges in the U.S. respond to elec-
toral pressures. Brace and Hall (1997) study death penalty decisions in 8 US states. They
find that justices in politically liberal states tend to vote more liberally (overturning death
sentences) when they are elected in partisan or nonpartisan elections, but not otherwise.
Huber and Gordon (2004) analyze trial court sentences of judges in Pennsylvania on ag-
gravated assault, rape and robbery convictions. They argue that because judges discount
the future value of retaining office, they become harsher as their terms proceed. They find
that sentences for these crimes are significantly longer the closer the sentencing judge is to
standing for reelection. Gordon and Huber (2007) analyze data on felony convictions in
Kansas, where 14 judicial districts use partisan competitive elections and 17 use retention
elections. They find that the sentences of judges in competitive election systems are harsher
than those in retention systems.5 Lim (2011) uses sentencing data from Kansas to esti-
mate a structural model that fully incorporates career concerns into judges’ behavior.6 She
shows that the sentencing behavior of elected judges is in fact an important determinant of
their reelection, and that while the sentencing behavior of appointed judges does not vary
much with the political orientation of the district, elected justices tend to be more lenient
in liberal leaning districts.7 Lim, Snyder, and Stro¨mberg (2010) shows that media coverage
of judicial decisions influence the decisions of elected (but not of appointed) judges.
In considering justices’ response to electoral pressures, the previous papers focus solely
on the influence of voters. The emphasis on voters is natural. It is in fact voters who
decide whether to keep an incumbent in office or select an alternative candidate. But a
5Gordon and Huber (2007) find that the sentences of elected judges become harsher as elections draw
closer, but that this is not the case in retention systems. They conclude from this that the incentive effect
of the electoral system is more pronounced than its selection effect.
6See Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005) for a similar approach in Congress.
7More broadly, there is overwhelming evidence showing that judges are sensitive to the political envi-
ronment. See Hanssen (2000), Besley and Payne (2005) and Canes-Wrone, Clark, and Park (2010) for US
states, Gely and Spiller (1990); Spiller and Gely (1992) for the US Supreme Court, Helmke (2002) and
Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi (2002, 2006) for the Supreme Court in Argentina, among many others.
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key component of the fates of candidates running for office in modern day elections is their
readiness to reach a large audience effectively. This was long recognized to be the case
in races for legislative seats (see for example Jacobson (1978, 1990), Green and Krasno
(1988, 1990), Gerber (1998), and Erikson and Palfrey (2000)), and has also become a main
ingredient in judicial elections (see Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, and Casey (2010), Hojnacki
and Baum (1992), Champagne (2000, 2004), Iyengar (2001), Bonneau (2005)).8 Because
of this, campaign contributions have become a central source of influence on candidates
running for office.
While it is clear that money affects election results (and thus in our case the character-
istics of justices sitting in the court), it is less clear whether money changes the decisions of
given elected officials, or, instead, chases like-minded candidates. A small number of papers
tackle the difficult problem of trying to establish the direction of causality between money
and votes. Bronars and Lott (1997), Stratmann (1991, 2002, 2009), and Kang (2011) study
the issue in the US Congress.9 De Figueiredo and Edwards (2007) analyze regulatory out-
comes in telecommunication. McCall (2003), Cann (2006), and Bonneau and Cann (2010)
analyze elected judges. In all, the evidence is non-conclusive, one way or the other.
In this paper we address a different, complementary, question about the relationship
between money and decisions in the court. We focus not on trying to disentangle the
incentive and selection effects of contributions, but on understanding how money affects
(arguably through both mechanisms) the characteristics and voting strategies of the justices
ultimately sitting in the court. As far as we are aware, we are the first to quantify the direct
and equilibrium impact of contributions on individual decisions and collective outcomes in
the court. To do this we follow the approach of Iaryczower and Shum (2011) and Iaryczower,
Lewis, and Shum (2011). The idea is to specify a model of decision-making in the court
that explicitly allows for both ideology and common values, and estimate the parameters
of the model using equilibrium information. Our model of collective decision-making builds
on Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998), and is closest to that of Duggan and Martinelli
(2001).10
8For theoretical contributions studying models of campaign contributions, see Snyder (1990), Snyder
(1992), Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1996), Grossman and Helpman (1999), and Prat (2002).
9See also Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder Jr. (2003) and the comprehensive review of the
literature in this paper.
10For structural estimation of ideological models of voting in committees (that do not directly incorporate
career concerns) see Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991), Heckman and Snyder (1997), Londregan (1999),
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3 A Model of Decision-Making in the Court
In this section, we describe the model of collective decision-making in the courts. In doing
so, we take the parameters of the problem as given, and their dependence on publicly
observable characteristics of the choice situation as understood. We make this relation
explicit in the estimation (Section 7.3).
The court is composed of n justices, i = 1, . . . , n, who consider T independent cases,
t = 1, . . . , T . In each case t, justice i can vote to uphold or overturn the decision of the
lower court. We denote this vote by vti ∈ {0, 1}, with vti = 0 indicating a vote to uphold and
vti = 1 a vote to overturn the decision of the lower court. The court aggregates the decisions
of the individual justices by simple majority rule; i.e. overturns (vt = 1) if
∑
i v
t
i ≥ n+12
and upholds (vt = 0) otherwise.
We consider two related models of individual behavior. In the expressive voting model,
we assume that in deciding their vote, justices care only about their individual vote. In
the strategic or outcome-oriented voting model, we assume instead that justices care about
the decision of the court. We assume that the goal of any justice i in any given case t is
that she (in the expressive voting model) or the court (in the strategic voting model) rules
according to i’s own best understanding of how the law applies to the particulars of the
case. Specifically, before voting in each case t, each justice i observes a private signal sit =
ωt +σitεit, where εit ∼ N (0, 1). Here ωt ∈ {0, 1} in an unobservable variable – for both the
econometrician and the justices – indicating whether the decision of the lower court should
be overturned (ωt = 1) or upheld (ωt = 0) according to the law, and θit = 1/σit is a scale
parameter that parametrizes the informativeness of i’s signals.11 Justice i has a payoff of
−piit ∈ (0, 1) when she/the court incorrectly overturns the lower court (vt = 1 when ωt = 0)
and of −(1 − piit) when she/the court incorrectly upholds the lower court (vt = 0 when
ωt = 1).
12 The payoffs of vt = ωt = 0 and vt = ωt = 1 are normalized to zero. Thus given
Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) – for the US Congress– and Martin and Quinn (2002, 2007) – for the
US Supreme Court. Degan and Merlo (2008) and de Paula and Merlo (2009) consider the nonparametric
identification and estimation of the ideological voting model. Coate and Conlin (2004), Coate, Conlin, and
Moro (2008), and Kawai and Watanabe (2009) also perform structural estimation of strategic voting (ie.
“pivotal voting”) models with ideological voters. Iaryczower, Katz, and Saiegh (2009) estimates a model
of strategic voting with incomplete information in the US Congress.
11We write θit and not simply θi, invariant in t, because in the estimation we will allow the precision of
information to depend on characteristics of the case. With identical observable characteristics across cases
we would have θit = θi for all t. The same remark applies to the bias piit below.
12Thus, pii < 1/2 reflects a bias towards upholding (or towards the Petitioner), while pii > 1/2 reflects
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information I, Justice i votes to overturn in case t if and only if Pri(ωt = 1|I) ≥ piit, or,
equivalently, if and only if Pri(I|ωt = 1)|/Pri(I|ωt = 0) ≥ piit1−piit
1−ρt
ρt
, where ρt ≡ Pr(ωt = 1)
denotes justices’ common prior probability that the decision of the lower court should be
overturned.13
The two alternative models of behavior differ in how much information each justice has
in equilibrium. In the expressive voting model, justices care about their own decision,
and therefore vote based on their own information sit, i.e., vote to overturn whenever
Pri(ωt = 1|sit) ≥ piit. Then I consists only of sit, and i votes to overturn if
φ(θit[sit − 1])
φ(θitsit)
≥ piit
1− piit
1− ρt
ρt
(1)
Let sexpit denote the value of sit that solves (1) with equality. Since L(s) ≡ Pr(s|ωt =
1)/Pr(s|ωt = 0) is increasing in s, i votes to overturn whenever sit ≥ sexpit , and to uphold.
These cutoff points sexpit for i = 1, . . . , n completely characterize behavior in the expressive
voting case.
In the strategic voting model, justices care about the decision of the court. As a
result, any justice i considers the implications of her vote assuming that she is pivotal for
the decision. (This supposition is not correct when the justice is not in fact pivotal, but
for the same reason these mistakes have no cost for the outcome-oriented justice.) This is
relevant because when justices change their vote in response to information, the event that
the other justices are evenly split between upholding and overturning is itself a valuable
signal for justice i.
The informational content of i being pivotal, or decisive, is captured by how likely it
is that i is pivotal when the lower court should be overturned, relative to how likely this
is when the lower court should be upheld, Lµ(Piv
i; θ). This likelihood ratio depends on
the voting strategy profile µ: if all other justices vote to uphold except when they receive
overwhelming evidence that the decision should be overturned, a split court is evidence for
a bias towards overturning (or towards the Respondent). These preconceptions can reflect a variety of
factors inducing a non-neutral approach to this case, such as ingrained theoretical arguments about the
law, personal experiences, or ideological considerations. They can also capture the effect of money.
13Note that since ωt is assumed to be unobservable, there is always information that would make any
two justices disagree about a case. Moreover, if sufficiently biased, two justices can disagree almost always.
In particular, with piit ≈ 0 (or piit ≈ 1), justice i is almost always ideological. On the other hand, when
piit = 1/2 for all i, the setting boils down to an unbiased, pure common values model.
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overturning, as half of the justices have very strong information towards overturning, while
the other half could have only weak evidence towards upholding. Lµ(Piv
i; θ) also depends
on the other justices’ quality of information, as not much can be inferred from their votes
if their own information is not very precise to begin with.
As in the expressive voting model, the monotone likelihood ratio property of the signals
implies that i’s best response to any strategy of the remaining justices is a cutoff strategy,
such that i votes to overturn if sit is above a cutpoint s
st
it , and to uphold otherwise. This in
turn implies that all responsive equilibria are cutoff equilibria, in which case we can write
Lµ(Piv
i; θ) simply as a function of the cutpoints, L(Pivi; θ, sstt ). A responsive equilibrium
therefore is completely characterized by cutpoints sstt = (s
st
1t, . . . , s
st
nt) such that
L(Pivi; θ, sstt )×
φ(θit[s
st
it − 1])
φ(θitsstit )
=
piit
1− piit
1− ρt
ρt
(2)
(In Appendix 7.2 we derive the more detailed expression for L(Pivi; θ, sstt ) that we use
in the estimation.)
Note that when we allow equilibrium strategies to be responsive to external forces such
as contributions, the expressive and strategic model imply a markedly different adjustment
process. We can think of the total change in strategy s∗i as having two parts. A first part
(say a direct effect) is a behavioral response to the change in i’s own bias and quality of
information. In fact, this is all there is to it in the expressive voting model. But if justices
care about the decision of the court, there is also an equilibrium effect, by which changes
in the contributions to justice j affect how justice i 6= j votes. Assume for instance that
justices’ strategies lean towards overturning if contributions for the Petitioner increase, and
suppose that this is in fact the case for all judges other than i. Then justice i interprets a
divided court as more favorable evidence towards upholding. This is because in this case
it takes more to convince (n− 1)/2 judges to uphold, and less to convince (n− 1)/2 judges
overturn the decision of the lower court. But this is precisely the situation in which i’s
vote changes the decision of the court. As a result, after evaluating the implications of her
vote, i becomes more inclined to uphold. This in turn triggers a similar response by other
members of the court, etc, until in the new equilibrium no further responses are necessary.
We return to this in Section 5.2.
We estimate the model using the two-step approach introduced in Iaryczower and Shum
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(2011). In the first step, we estimate the conditional voting probabilities γi,0 ≡ Pr(vit =
1|ωt = 0) and γi,1 ≡ Pr(vit = 1|ωt = 1), and the prior ρ ≡ Pr(ωt = 1) as a function of
characteristics of the justices Zi and the cases Xt. Using these estimates we recover the
equilibrium strategies s∗i = s
∗
i (Zi, Xt) and the two structural parameters, pii = pii(Zi, Xt)
and θi = θi(Zi, Xt), for each justice i using the equilibrium restrictions implied by the
model. (We describe our estimation approach in detail in Section 7.3 in the Appendix.)
4 Money in Judicial Politics: Data and Specification
The voting data, case-specific information, and most of the non-contribution justice-specific
information was available from the State Court Data Project (SCDP) (Brace, Langer, and
Hall (2000)), which provides a detailed compilation of data for state Supreme Court criminal
and civil cases in all fifty states of the United States during the years 1995 through 1998.
Here we consider civil cases related to torts, contracts, and civil government issues. Because
of data limitations for contributions records, we focus on only eight states: Alabama,
Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. We also exclude
cases in which some justices sitting in the court did not vote.14 This results in a sample
of 1914 cases across eight states. The SCDP also includes a justice-level dataset, that
provides data for each of the 520 justices that served on some court during the period
observed. Other sources – the Court Statistics Project at the National Center for State
Courts, Marquis’ Who’s Who, and state Supreme Courts web sites – provided additional
biographical information on each of the justices, including background and experience prior
to state Supreme Court.
The main variable in the analysis is voting data per se. We classify justices’ decisions
as either to overturn or uphold the decision of the lower court (in favor of the Petitioner
or the Respondent at the Supreme Court level). This coding follows from the fact that
appellate courts do not determine liability in civil cases, but instead are responsible for
assessing whether or not errors have been committed at trial (Bureau of Justice Statistics).
14Note that the equilibrium cutpoint of each justice will be different for each different composition of
the voting members of the court, implying different conditional probabilities of voting to overturn in each
state for each configuration of voting members, even fixing the covariates Xt. Including only the votes in
which all justices vote therefore dramatically reduces the number of parameters to be estimated. This still
leaves a significant number of cases in the sample.
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Non-monetary Variables. Non-monetary covariates include all case-specific covariates
Xt, and the “non-monetary” justice-specific covariates Z
NM
it .
Case-specific covariates include the manner in which the State Supreme Court takes
jurisdiction (appeal, or others), the type of Petitioner and Respondent (whether business,
government – including both local and state governments, or others), the substantive issue
under consideration (contracts, torts, or civil government cases), and the legal issue under
consideration (evidence, discretion (sentencing and jury instruction), legal standing, and
others). Therefore
Xtδ = appealt×δ1+
(
businesst × δB2
+govt × δG2
)
+
 contractst × δC3+tortst × δT3
+civ.gov.t × δCG3
+
 evidencet × δE4+discretiont × δD4
+standingt × δS4
 ,
and similarly for Xtη. Table 3 in the Appendix summarizes the case-specific data, including
the proportion of unanimous and minimal winning votes in each state.15
“Non-monetary” justice-specific covariates ZNMit include (i) “experience” variables, and
(ii) “context” variables. The experience variables include (i.a) prior judicial experience
(years), (i.b) prior political experience (1/0), and (i.c) experience in the supreme court
(years). Context variables include (ii.a) Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000)’s party-adjusted
judicial ideology (PAJID) score for each justice at time of appointment, and (ii.b) the
(updated version of) Berry et al’s citizen (CIT) ideology (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and
Hanson (1998)) for the relevant state in the year in which the decision was made. For both
PAJID and CIT, larger values denote a more liberal stance.16 To allow the coefficient of
CIT to change with the number of years remaining in the term we also include (ii.c) the
interaction of CIT with the number of years to end of term (Termremain). Therefore
ZNMit α
NM =
 jud.experiencei × αJ1+pol.experiencei × αP1
+court.experienceit × αC1
+
 PAJIDi × αP2+CITit × αC2
+(CITit × Tit)× αI2
 ,
15While a majority of cases are decided by unanimous decisions, there is also a sizable fraction of non-
unanimous decisions.
16CIT is the measure of citizen ideology proposed by Berry et al. The measure infers the ideological
position of the electorate from the ideological orientations of members of Congress, as operationalized by
interest-group ratings. In particular, Berry et al first estimate CIT in each district of a state by weighting
the ideology score for the district’s incumbent and challenger with the proportion of votes each received
in the election, and then aggregate at the state level. Berry et al also propose a measure of state elite’s
ideology with a similar procedure, using the ideology of members of congress to estimate the ideological
positions of state legislators and the Governor. Brace et al’s PAJID variable builds on Berry et al’s measures
of citizen and elite ideology, but also incorporates information about the political party of each judge.
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and similarly for ZNMit ζ
NM . Table 4 in Appendix 7.1 summarizes the non-contributions
justice-specific data.
Contributions and the Money Slant. Differently than in other public offices, justices
have to justify the reasoning behind their decisions. Because of this, similar legal positions
across industries or parties’ types will naturally be associated with similar decisions by
the same justice. As a result, the aggregate contributions of the group of individuals and
organizations sharing a preferred legal position of the court on a given issue can potentially
have an impact on the general position taken by a justice on a number of particular cases
in which these issues are central. This is the effect of contributions we focus on in this
paper.17
The interest group itself can be defined in a more broad or narrow way. In our bench-
mark exercise we will follow a broad view, that corresponds with the accounts of observers
in the field, that “Judicial elections have become a multi-million-dollar duel, pitting busi-
ness and conservative groups against plaintiffs lawyers and unions.” (Brennan Center).
Because of this, in our benchmark specification we aggregate contributions in four interest
groups : business, unions, (non-corporate) lawyers, and education organizations.18, 19 With
the interest groups given, we write pt = j if overturning in case t favors interest group j (if
the Petitioner in case t belongs to interest group j), and similarly rt = k if upholding favors
interest group k (if the Respondent in case t belongs to interest group k). The coding of
business, unions and education is straightforward. We code the Petitioner (Respondent) in
case t in the lawyers’ interest group if (and only if) the issue in the case is tort or civil gov-
ernment and the Petitioner (Respondent) is an individual facing a business or government
organization.
We then define the money slant of justice i in case t as the difference between the
proportion of contributions to justice i coming from the interest group favoring overturning
and the interest group favoring upholding the decision of the lower court. Specifically,
17A second effect is the possible effect of the individual contributions of the parties to a given case. If
present, this individual effect would act on top of the interest group effect, inducing a preference for a given
party in a given case above what is the standard behavior of the judge on similar issues. We leave tackling
this more nuanced individual effect for future research.
18In Appendix 7.5 we present results for an alternative classification that distinguishes between different
economic interests within Business. The basic gist of the results is qualitatively unchanged.
19Because of its limited impact in our sample, removing educational organizations from our interest
group definition would leave the results practically unchanged.
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letting cit(j) denote the contributions to judge i by interest group j in i’s most recent
election cycle before t, the money slant of justice i in case t is
mit =
cit(pt)∑
j cit(j)
− cit(rt)∑
j cit(j)
We compute the money slant using item level data on contributions made available by
the National Institute on Money in State Politics. Implicit in the definition of the money
slant is a temporal limit on the set of contributions to be included. The relevant total
is the total of contributions to justice i on the most recent election cycle before the year
of the decision t. Thus, for example, if a justice is elected in 1992 and 1998, and receives
contributions in the electoral cycle 1991/92, and in the electoral cycle 1997/98, the relevant
contributions for decisions in 1995 and 1996 are those of 1991-92, the relevant contributions
for decisions in 1997 are those of 1997, and the relevant contributions for decisions in 1998
are those of 1997-98. If an incumbent justice did not run for election and therefore had no
contributions prior to t, we take this as zero. However when we do not have contributions
data for the previous election of an incumbent (say if the incumbent was elected in 1988),
but we know that the incumbent was indeed elected, we take this as missing data.
In the econometric specification, we allow for the possibility that a money slant favoring
overturning may have a systematically different effect than a money slant which favors
upholding the decision of the lower court. To that end, we include an interaction term
of the money slant with an indicator for whether the money slant favors upholding (i.e.,
{mit < 0}). Moreover, to allow the money slant to vary with years to end of term, we also
include an interaction of money slant with the variable termremain.
The previous variables capture the effect of i’s money slant on i’s own behavior. And
in the expressive voting model, no more is needed, as i’s money slant does not affect j’s
behavior. However, in the equilibrium of the strategic voting model, i’s money slant will
also change j’s behavior. In a nutshell, if i’s money slant m′i in case t induces her to
overturn more often than money slant mi, i will demand more information in favor of the
Respondent in order to uphold. But then all else equal, the event that j 6= i can change
the decision of the court is more likely to arise when there is more information supporting
upholding. Because j only cares about the direction of her vote when it has an effect on
outcomes, she will update her consideration of the case accordingly (we elaborate on this in
Section 5.2). For this reason, we include the variable m−i,t, which we define as the average
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money slant of members of the court other than i. Thus ZMαM is
ZMit α
M = mit × α3 + (mit × I{mit<0})× α4 + (mit × Tit)× α5 +m−i,t × α6.
and similarly for ZMit ζ
M .
5 Results
A necessary first step to answer the questions we raised in the introduction is to ascertain
the effect of campaign contributions on the fundamentals: (i) justices’ prior beliefs ρt =
ρ(Xt), and, for each justice i, (ii) her bias piit = pi(Zi, Xt), (iii) quality of information
θit = θ(Zi, Xt), and (iv) strategy s
∗
it = s
∗(Zi, Xt). In order to estimate these quantities
of interest, we begin by estimating the coefficients of the conditional voting probability
functions γ1(Xt, Zi) and γ0(Xt, Zi), and the prior ρ(Xt). For any given court composition
C and case characteristics Xt, we then use the predicted values of γi,t,1 = γ1(Xt, Zit) and
γi,t,0 = γ0(Xt, Zit) for each justice i of C to recover the values of s
∗
it, θit, and piit.
Our results, then, have two parts. The first stage MLE estimates of the coefficients
of ρ(Xt), γ0(Xt, Zit) and γ1(Xt, Zit) are presented in Table 1. These results – which we
discuss below – offer the first measure of the impact of case and justice-specific covariates
on justices’ types and strategies, but are difficult to interpret in terms of the magnitude of
the effects on the quantities of interest. To describe our main results we compute estimates
of the bias, quality of information, and strategies for each state’s supreme court, fixing all
case-specific covariates at the state-specific sample means, the non-monetary individual-
specific covariates at their values for the justices sitting in the court, and the money slant
of each justice at various benchmark levels.
We organize the presentation of results as follows. We begin in Section 5.1 by discussing
the complete set of estimates for the Supreme Court of Alabama, as an example, to facilitate
the interpretation of the main results. We then present the main results in Section 5.2.
5.1 An Example: The Supreme Court of Alabama
To fix ideas, we begin by discussing the full set of estimates in an example. Table 1
presents the estimates of prior, bias, quality of information and strategies of each justice in
the Alabama Supreme Court across cases, fixing all case-specific covariates at their state-
specific sample means, the non-monetary individual-specific covariates at their values for
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the justices sitting in the court, and the average money slant of each justice i in cases
in which overturning favors lawyers and upholding favors business.20 (For simplicity of
exposition, in Table 1 we present point estimates only. Table 6 in Appendix (Section 7.1)
provides standard errors of all “second-stage” estimates presented in Table 1. Table 5 in
the Appendix presents the point estimates for all courts in the sample.)
[Table 1 about here]
On the leftmost column, we indicate the estimate of the common prior probability that
the lower court should be overturned. The number ρ = 0.68 indicates that on average (for
the mix of cases considered by the Alabama Supreme court), and before observing any
additional information about the case, justices assign a probability of about 2/3 that the
lower court’s decision is incorrect and should be overturned. The first two columns present
the MLE estimates of the probability that justice i votes to overturn when the decision of
the lower court should be upheld (γit0) and the probability that justice i votes to overturn
when the decision of the lower court should be overturned (γit1). Thus, for example, justice
Alva Maddox had a probability of γit1 = 0.90 of (correctly) voting to overturn when the
Petitioner should win, and a probability of 1− γit0 = 1− 0.02 = 0.98 of (correctly) voting
to uphold when the Respondent should win.
Column 3 presents the estimate of the quality of the information of each justice. As
we pointed out earlier, this estimate is an increasing function of the difference between γi,1
and γi,0. The higher quality-of-information estimate for justice Maddox (3.28) vis a vis
that of justice Perry Hooper Sr. (2.89), for example, reflects both a larger probability of
correctly voting to overturn (0.90 vs 0.82), and a lower probability of incorrectly voting to
overturn (0.022 vs 0.024). Column 4 presents the equilibrium cutpoint. This is the signal
threshold s∗i such that justice i votes to uphold whenever she observes a signal below s
∗
i
and to overturn otherwise. Thus for example while justice Maddox would vote to uphold
after observing a signal below s∗MAD = 0.61, it would take a signal below s
∗
HOU = 0.52 for
justice Gorman Houston to vote in the same way.
Equilibrium strategies respond to both quality of information and bias. The justices’
bias are shown in columns 5 and 6 in the table. Note that in both the strategic and the
20Because interest groups contributing to justice i enter in different cases as Petitioners and Respondents,
averaging over all cases would not be adequate.
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expressive voting models, justice Cook is more inclined to overturn than justice Houston,
and him in turn more than justice Maddox. In the expressive voting model, for example, for
the average case mix, justice Cook requires less evidence (a belief of at least piexpCOO = 0.26
that the case should be overturned) than justice Houston (piexpHOU = 0.73) and justice Maddox
(piexpMAD = 0.88) to vote to overturn. The difference between columns 5 and 6 is due to
equilibrium information in the strategic voting model, as captured by the likelihood ratio
of the event of being pivotal to the court’s decision conditioning on whether the law and
the facts of the case favor overturning or upholding (column 7). Given the equilibrium
strategies, for seven of the nine justices being pivotal carries information towards upholding.
In order to rationalize the same voting behavior, the bias in the strategic voting model
for these justices has to be more favorable to overturning than in the expressive voting
model. On the other hand, for justices Cook and Kennedy, being pivotal carries information
towards overturning. Therefore to rationalize the same voting behavior, the bias in the
strategic voting model for these justices has to be more favorable to upholding than in the
expressive voting model.
5.2 The Effect of Contributions on Judicial Decisions
We can now address our two main questions:
1. What is the effect of campaign contributions on justices’ decisions? In particular,
how does money change the voting strategies of the justices ultimately sitting on the
court? Do justices respond strategically to contributions to other members?
2. What is the effect of campaign contributions on the effectiveness of the court? In
particular, does money lead to a larger probability of incorrect decisions?
First Stage Estimates. Our first step is to consider the first-stage coefficient estimates
in Table 2. Because changes in justices’ bias, expertise and voting strategies will ulti-
mately affect outcomes through the conditional voting probabilities, if γ0 and γ1 were to
be unresponsive to contributions we would conclude that money has no effect on types and
strategies. Instead, the results show that the money slant has a statistically and substan-
tively significant effect on both conditional voting probabilities.
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[Table 2 about here]
The coefficients ζ3 and α3 capture the effect of the money slant on γ0 and γ1 when
mit > 0 and the justice served the full term in office. The estimates for ζ3 and α3 are
both positive and statistically significant. Since ζ3 = 4.36(0.45) > α3 = 1.81(0.28) > 0
(standard errors in parenthesis), a larger money slant is consistent with a lower cutpoint
s∗; i.e., with a voting strategy that leans more heavily towards overturning. This change in
behavior is due to both preferences and information: ζ3 >> α3 implies that a larger money
slant is consistent with a lower quality of information, and the equilibrium condition (8)
in the expressive voting model then implies that a larger money slant is also consistent
with an increased bias in favor of overturning (a smaller pii).
21 ζ5 and α5 capture the
change in the coefficients of the money slant with time remaining in office. The estimates
ζ5 = −0.58(0.12) and α5 = 0.03(0.02) suggest that the effect of the money slant on the
conditional voting probabilities and deep parameters is stronger as the end of term gets
closer.
The previous discussion focuses on the effect of i’s money slant on her own voting
behavior. However, in the equilibrium of the strategic voting model, i’s money slant will
also change j’s behavior. To allow for this strategic effect, we allow j’s voting behavior to
vary with the money slant of other members of the court. In particular, in our specification,
the coefficients ζ6 and α6 capture the effect of the average money slant of other members of
the court on an individual justice’s conditional voting probabilities. Note that in order to
be consistent with the strategic voting model, m−i,t should have the opposite effect of mit.
This is because when i’s contributions induce her to be more prone to overturning, then all
else equal the event that j 6= i can change the decision of the court is more likely to arise
when there is more information in favor of upholding the decision of the lower court. As
a result, j becomes more prone to upholding. Our estimates of ζ6 = −1.21(0.39) < 0 and
α6 = −2.55(0.34) < 0 are consistent with this interpretation. We discuss these results in
more depth below.
21The coefficients ζ4 and α4 capture the change in the coefficient of the money slant on γ0 and γ1 when
mit < 0. Including these interaction terms allows substantial flexibility in how the money slant affects the
bias pii and quality of information θi, and then ultimately the voting strategies and conditional probabilities
of voting to overturn. The results, however, suggest that the effects of money on the conditional voting
probabilities are not qualitatively different depending on whether the money slant favors overturning or
upholding. In fact, ζ4 = 1.78(1.49) > α4 = 0.07(0.05) ' 0.
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Direct and Equilibrium Effects of Money on Outcomes. To distinguish between
the direct and equilibrium effects of money on vote outcomes, we write the change in
strategies s∗1 − s∗0 due to a change from an initial money slant m0 to money slant m1 as:
s∗1 − s∗0 = (s∗1 − s˜1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equilibrium effect
+ (s˜1 − s∗0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
,
where s˜1 is the strategy profile that corresponds to m
1 when we shut down the effect of
m−i,t on the conditional voting probabilities for the difference m1 −m0.
Figure 1 shows the results of this decomposition for the no-slant vector m0 = 0 and
the average money slant of each justice i in cases in which overturning favors lawyers and
upholding favors business, m1, which we adopt as a benchmark for comparison.22
[Figure 1 about here]
The left panel plots the overall change in the strategy cutpoint. This shows that changes
are larger in magnitude in states in which justices’ original strategy leans most towards
overturning to begin with (Louisiana, Texas, Montana, and Alabama), and relatively mod-
erate in Ohio and Pennsylvania, where the opposite is true. The right panel shows the
decomposition of the total change in strategy in a direct effect and an equilibrium effect.
Note that because of the different allocation of contributions across members of the differ-
ent courts, the direction of the effect is court specific. In Montana, and Ohio, for example,
the equilibrium effect generally counteracts the direct effect. In Louisiana and Texas the
equilibrium effect is uneven across members of the court.
To evaluate the magnitude of the effect of money on behavior, we compute the effect
of changing the money slant from zero to the benchmark m1 on the probability that each
justice (and the Court) votes to overturn. In particular, we decompose the total change
in the direct effect and the equilibrium effect. The result (for each court in the sample) is
illustrated in Figure 3.
22Figure 5 in the Appendix (Section 7.1) plots the empirical distribution of money slant at the justice/case
level, along with the empirical distribution of the justice-specific average money slant in our benchmark,
m1. Note that in a large number of cases the parties to the case are not associated with a lobby contributing
to members of the court. Thus for the average case, contributions matter little. It is clear as well that
very often this is not the case. This is true at the case/justice level, as well as when we consider average
money slant per justice at the benchmark m1.
18
[Figure 3 about here]
Three conclusions emerge. First, contributions have a large effect on the behavior of
individual justices. In Louisiana, for example, three justices are more than 10% more
likely to overturn with the benchmark money slant than in the absence of contributions,
while one justice is more than 20% more likely to uphold relative to the no-contributions
benchmark. Second, the equilibrium effect is generally consequential. While the magnitude
of the equilibrium effects vary substantially by court, in several cases the equilibrium effect
has a substantial contribution to the total change in the probability of overturning (this
is particularly true in the courts of Montana and Ohio). Third, contributions have a
relatively small effect on the probability that the Court overturns the decision of the lower
court. This is a major takeaway point: while contributions have a relatively large effect on
individual justices, the effect of contributions on the votes of individual justices typically
counteract each other at the court level. Only in two cases we find a non-negligible effect
of contributions at the court level. In Louisiana, the court is 2.6% more likely to overturn
with the benchmark money slant than in the absence of contributions, and in Texas the
change is 1.6%. In both cases the equilibrium effect is relatively important and counteracts
the larger direct effects, of about 4.3 % and 2.9% for Louisiana and Texas respectively.
Money and Mistakes in the Court. Our second goal is to evaluate the effect of
campaign contributions on the effectiveness of the court. To do this we quantify the effect
of contributions on the probability that an incorrect decision is reached. In particular, we
compute the effect of changing the money slant from zero to the benchmark money slant
m1 on the probability of incorrectly overturning and incorrectly upholding the decision of
the lower court.
[Figure 3 about here]
The left panel of Figure 3 plots the probability that the court reaches an incorrect
decision at the benchmark money slant. The total probability of an incorrect decision
is relatively low for all but two states, Texas and Louisiana, where it reaches 2.5% and
4% respectively. The figure also shows the probability of incorrect decisions by type of
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mistake. In both Texas and Louisiana the significant type of error is to overturn incorrectly
(7% of the time, and 11% of the time, respectively), while the probability of upholding a
decision that should be overturned is marginal. In Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, instead,
the prevailing type of error is to uphold a decision that should be overturned (1.3% of
the time, and 1.7% of the time, respectively). The right panel of Figure 3 compares the
probability of an incorrect decision at the benchmark money slant vis a vis the error rate
with no contributions. In all states, money increases the probability that the court reaches
an incorrect decision, but the effect is small in magnitude for all states but Texas and
Louisiana, where it accounts for 1.6% and 2.6%, respectively. Thus, on average money
has a relatively low impact on the probability that the court reaches an incorrect decision.
However, two important qualifications must be emphasized.
First, note that the effect of money on the probability of mistakes at the court level
for Louisiana and Texas is almost identical to the effect of money on the probability of
overturning the decision of the lower courts. To understand this result, call βo(m) the
probability of incorrectly overturning, and βu(m) the probability of incorrectly upholding
the decision of the lower court given money slant m. Then the change in the probability
of overturning ∆o when changing the money slant from m
0 to m1 is
∆o ≡ ρ[βu(m0)− βu(m1)] + (1− ρ)[βo(m1)− βo(m0)],
while the change in the probability of a mistake ∆m when changing the money slant from
m0 to m1 is
∆m ≡ ρ[βu(m1)− βu(m0)] + (1− ρ)[βo(m1)− βo(m0)].
Note that the expressions for ∆o and ∆m only differ in the first term, which depends
on mistakes with different configuration of contributions conditional on the decision of the
lower court being correct. But according to our estimates, both with zero contributions
and in the benchmark money slant, the courts of Louisiana and Texas almost never uphold
a lower court decision that they should overturn. As a result, ∆o ≈ ∆m. This implies, in
particular, that our previous results regarding the effect of the benchmark money slant on
the probability that the court overturns are almost entirely driven by a larger probabil-
ity of incorrectly overturning decisions that should be upheld. Thus contributions work,
on average, towards promoting mistakes, rather than rectifying mistakes from previous
decisions.
20
Second, it should also be noted that while the overall effects on the probability of
mistakes are relatively small, this is not because of the absence of a corresponding impact
at the individual level. In fact, in all eight states money significantly changes the probability
of mistakes of some members of the court. This is illustrated in Figure 4 for the different
courts in the sample, which plots the counterfactual effect on the probability that each
justice (and the Court) incorrectly votes to overturn (blue bars) and uphold (red bars)
when the money slant changes from zero to the benchmark, m1.
[Figure 4 about here]
The dampened response at the aggregate level is due to two factors. First, the collective
body that is the court is “wiser” than each of its individual components. This is, naturally,
an old idea dating back to Condorcet. When each member of the court makes a mistake with
probability x, the Court makes a mistake with probability smaller than x. Second, different
justices in the same court receive opposite influence. In Pennsylvania, for example, while
the probability that justice Saylor incorrectly overturns increases by 8%, the probability
that justice Nigro incorrectly overturns decreases by 7%. Similarly, in Michigan while the
probability that justice Brickley incorrectly overturns increases by 11%, the probability
that justice Cavanagh incorrectly upholds increases by 16%. As a result, influence at the
individual level doesn’t translate to influence in the Court’s decision.
6 Conclusion
The ascent of money in judicial campaigns has become a source of concern for a wide range
of interests in society, from media to judges, lawyers, businesses and voters. The concern is
that money can now influence (either directly, or through the selection of friendly judges)
the decisions of many of the high courts in the U.S.
In this paper, we study how campaign contributions affect the characteristics and voting
behavior of elected judges. To do this we use a structural estimation approach, that allows
us to disentangle the effects of money on justices’ characteristics and voting strategies.
We pose two questions. Our first goal is to disentangle the direct and indirect channels
through which money affects justices’ decisions. Do voting strategies change with campaign
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contributions? Do justices respond strategically to contributions to other members of the
court? Our second goal is to evaluate the effect of contributions on the effectiveness of the
court. Does money lead to a larger probability of incorrect decisions?
We show that a judge’s voting strategy leans more heavily towards an interest group
the larger are its contributions to the judge, and the smaller are its contributions to other
members of the court. This indirect effect of contributions is consistent with an equilibrium
adjustment to contributions to other members of the court when justices vote strategically
and care about the decisions of the court. Our estimates indicate that this equilibrium
effect is a meaningful source of variation in justices’ voting behavior. To quantify the effect
of contributions on the decisions of the court we compute the effect of changing the money
slant (i) on the probability that each justice votes to overturn and (ii) on the probability
that each judge votes incorrectly. We show that in both cases the observed contributions
have a large effect on the behavior of individual judges, but only a small effect on the
decisions and effectiveness of the Court.
While our analysis was limited to judicial decisions, elected judges are in many ways,
similar to politicians. Because of this, we believe that our results bring about broader
lessons on the effect of contributions on policy decisions. In particular, our results suggest
that more research is needed in the court, as well as in legislatures and other collective
bodies, to understand the panel effects shaping committee members’ response to contribu-
tions.
Understanding more fully the effect of money on public policy is particularly critical
in light of the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court (Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission) freeing corporations from restrictions on political spending
in elections. Much work remains ahead. First, we aim to bring forward into our analysis
the contribution decisions of the interest groups. This will allow us to better understand
the motives and strategies of different interest groups, and how they relate to the outcomes
we observe in terms of the characteristics and strategies of the justices sitting in the court.
Second, we aim to expand the temporal coverage of our analysis. Because of data avail-
ability, our analysis was based on cases considered between 1995 and 1998, and therefore
on contributions given between 1990 and 1998. But the issues considered here only became
more salient since then, with business associations responding to the overwhelming pres-
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ence of lawyers in contributions that were typical of the 90’s. This requires a considerable
effort in data collection, to extend the coverage of state Supreme Courts decisions (as in
the SCDP) to the present. We hope to be able to contribute in this area as well. Finally,
we aim to extend our analysis to other political offices, in order to better understand how
money shapes public policy across different issue areas and branches of government.
23
References
Ansolabehere, S., J. M. de Figueiredo, and J. M. Snyder Jr. (2003): “Why Is There so
Little Money in U.S. Politics?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(1), 105–130.
Baron, D. P. (1994): “Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters,” American
Political Science Review, 88, 33–47.
Berry, W., E. Ringquist, R. Fording, and R. Hanson (1998): “Measuring Citizen and
Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93,” American Journal of Political Science,
42(1), 327–348.
Besley, T. J., and A. A. Payne (2005): “Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does
Judicial Selection Matter?,” LSE STICERD Research Paper No. PEPP04.
Bonneau, C. W. (2005): “What Price Justice(s)? Understanding Campaign Spending in State
Supreme Court Elections,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 5, 107–124.
Bonneau, C. W., and D. M. Cann (2010): “The Effect of Campaign Contributions on Judicial
Decisionmaking,” Typeset.
Brace, P., and M. Hall (1997): “The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and Rules
in the Politics of Judicial Choice,” The Journal of Politics, 59(4), 1206–1231.
Brace, P., L. Langer, and M. Hall (2000): “Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme
Court Judges,” The Journal of Politics, 66(2), 387–413.
Bronars, S. G., and J. R. Lott (1997): “Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician
Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?,”
Journal of Law and Economics, 40(2), 317–350.
Canes-Wrone, B., T. S. Clark, and J.-K. Park (2010): “Judicial Independence and Re-
tention Elections,” Forthcoming, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
Cann, D. M. (2006): “Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making,”
Typeset.
Champagne, A. (2000): “Interest Groups and Judicial Elections,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review, 34, 1391–1409.
(2004): “Tort Reform and Judicial Selection,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 38,
1483–1515.
Clinton, J. D., S. Jackman, and D. Rivers (2004): “The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call
Data,” American Political Science Review, 55, 355–370.
Coate, S., and M. Conlin (2004): “A Group Rule-Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout:
Theory and Evidence,” American Economic Review, 94, 1476–1504.
24
Coate, S., M. Conlin, and A. Moro (2008): “The performance of pivotal-voter models in
small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas liquor referenda,” Journal of Public Economics, 92,
582–596.
Degan, A., and A. Merlo (2008): “Do Voters Vote Ideologically?,” Working Paper, U. Penn.
De Figueiredo, R. J., and G. Edwards (2007): “Does Private Money Buy Public Policy?
Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications,” Journal of Eco-
nomics & Management Strategy, 16, 547–576.
de Paula, A., and A. Merlo (2009): “Identification and Estimation of Preference Distributions
when Voters are Ideological,” Working Paper, U. Penn.
Diermeier, D., M. Keane, and A. Merlo (2005): “A Political Economy Model of Congres-
sional Careers,” American Economic Review, pp. 347–373.
Duggan, J., and C. Martinelli (2001): “A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 37, 259–294.
Erikson, R., and T. Palfrey (2000): “Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and
Data,” American Political Science Review, 94, 595–609.
Feddersen, T., and W. Pesendorfer (1997): “Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation
in Elections With Private Information,” Econometrica, 65, 1029–1058.
(1998): “Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under
Strategic Voting,” American Political Science Review, 92, 23–35.
Gely, R., and P. Spiller (1990): “A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory
Decisions with Applications to the ”State Farm” and ”Grove City Cases”,” Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, 6(2), 263–300.
Gerber, A. (1998): “Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes
Using Instrumental Variables,” American Political Science Review, (2), 401–411.
Gordon, S., and G. Huber (2007): “The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent
Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, pp. 107—138.
Green, D. P., and J. S. Krasno (1988): “Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reesti-
mating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections,” American Journal of Political
Science, 32, 884–907.
(1990): “Rebuttal to Jacobson’s “New Evidence for Old Arguments”,” American Journal
of Political Science, 34, 363–372.
Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman (1996): “Electoral Competition and Special Interest
Politics,” The Review of Economic Studies, 63(2), 265–286.
(1999): “Competing for Endorsements,” The American Economic Review, 89(3), 501–
524.
25
Hanssen, A. (2000): “Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: an Empirical Analysis
of the States,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 16(2), 534–571.
Heckman, J., and J. J. Snyder (1997): “Linear Probability Models of the Demand for At-
tributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators,” The
RAND Journal of Economics, 28(0), S142–S189, Special Issue in Honor of Richard E. Quandt.
Helmke, G. (2002): “The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina
under Dictatorship and Democracy,” American Political Science Review, 96(2), 291–303.
Hojnacki, M., and L. Baum (1992): “Choosing Judicial Candidates: How Voters Explain
Their Decisions,” Judicature, 75(6), 300–309.
Huber, G. A., and S. C. Gordon (2004): “Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind
When It Runs for Office?,” American Journal of Political Science, 48, 247–263.
Iaryczower, M., G. Katz, and S. Saiegh (2009): “Voting in the Bicameral Congress: Large
Majorities as a Signal of Quality.,” HSS, California Institute of Technology.
Iaryczower, M., G. Lewis, and M. Shum (2011): “To Elect or to Appoint? Bias, Informa-
tion, and Responsiveness of Bureaucrats and Politicians,” HSS Working Paper 1323, California
Institute of Technology.
Iaryczower, M., and M. Shum (2011): “The Value of Information in the Court. Get it Right,
Keep it Tight.,” Forthcoming, American Economic Review.
Iaryczower, M., P. Spiller, and M. Tommasi (2002): “Judicial Independence in Unstable
Environments, Argentina 1935-1998,” American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 699–716.
Iaryczower, M., P. Spiller, and M. Tommasi (2006): “Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of
Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation,” American Political Science Review, 100, 85–97.
Iyengar, S. (2001): “Effects of Media-Based Campaigns on Candidate and Voter Behavior:
Implications for Judicial Elections,” Indiana Law Review, 35, 691–699.
Jacobson, G. C. (1978): “The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections,” The
American Political Science Review, 72(2), 469–491.
(1990): “The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old
Arguments,” American Journal of Political Science, 34(2), 334–362.
Kang, K. (2011): “Lobbying for Power: a Structural Model of Lobbying in the Energy Sector,”
working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Kawai, K., and Y. Watanabe (2009): “Inferring Strategic Voting,” Northwestern University,
Department of Economics.
Lim, C. (2011): “Turnover and Accountability of Appointed and Elected Judges,” Typeset,
Stanford University.
26
Lim, C., J. M. Snyder, and D. Stro¨mberg (2010): “Measuring Media Influence on U.S. State
Courts.,” Typeset, Stanford University.
Londregan, J. (1999): “Estimating Legislators’ Preferred Points,” Political Analysis, 8(1), 35–
56.
Martin, A., and K. Quinn (2002): “Dynamic ideal point estimation via Markov chain Monte
Carlo for the US Supreme Court, 1953-1999,” Political Analysis, 10(2), 134–153.
(2007): “Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court,” Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, 23(2), 365–385.
McCall, M. (2003): “The Politics of Judicial Elections: The Influence of Campaign Contribu-
tions on the Voting Patterns of Texas Supreme Court Justices, 1994-1997,” Politics & Policy,
31, 314–343.
Poole, K., and H. Rosenthal (1985): “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis,”
American Journal of Political Science, 29, 357–384.
(1991): “Patterns of Congressional Voting,” American Journal of Political Science, 35,
228–278.
Prat, A. (2002): “Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and
Multiple Lobbies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 103, 162–189.
Sample, J., A. Skaggs, J. Blitzer, and L. Casey (2010): “The New Politics of Judicial
Elections 2000-2009,” Discussion paper, Brennan Center for Justice.
Snyder, J. (1990): “Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives,
1980-1986,” The Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), 1195–1227.
Snyder, J. M. (1992): “Long-Term Investing in Politicians: Or, Give Early, Give Often,” Journal
of Law & Economics, 35, 15–43.
Spiller, P., and R. Gely (1992): “Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The De-
terminants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988,” The RAND Journal
of Economics, 23(4), 463–492.
Stratmann, T. (1991): “What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects
of Money and Votes,” Southern Economic Journal, 57(3), 606–620.
(2002): “Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial
Services Legislation,” Journal of Law & Economics, 45(2), 345–374.
(2009): “How Prices Matter in Politics: The Returns to Campaign Advertising,” Public
Choice.
27
Table 1: Example: The Supreme Court of Alabama
Justice
Almon, Reneau P 0.050 0.919 3.046 0.541 0.762 0.591 0.452
Cook, Ralph D. 0.282 0.977 2.575 0.224 0.259 0.421 2.078
Houston, Gorman  0.056 0.926 3.038 0.524 0.731 0.574 0.495
Kennedy, Mark  0.317 0.982 2.585 0.185 0.209 0.388 2.388
Maddox, Alva Hugh 0.022 0.897 3.285 0.615 0.883 0.708 0.322
Shores, Janie L. 0.047 0.923 3.099 0.540 0.761 0.593 0.458
Hooper Sr., Perry O. 0.024 0.817 2.890 0.687 0.912 0.695 0.220
Lyons, Champ Jr. 0.072 0.925 2.898 0.504 0.692 0.554 0.552
See, Harold F. 0.076 0.917 2.814 0.509 0.700 0.556 0.538
Alabama       
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Table 2: Coefficients of the common prior function ρ(Xt), and the individual state-
contingent probabilities of voting to overturn the decision of the lower court, γ0(Xt, Zit)
and γ1(Xt, Zit).
1.835 0.941 4.973
(18.954) (9.702) (42.177)
Case 
Specific
Constant
-0.704 -0.099 -0.473
-(6.185) -(3.290) -(12.344)
Appeal
-0.197 1.420 1.583
-(2.500) (11.023) (9.642)
-0.248 0.449 0.192
-(2.746) (5.256) (4.257)
Petitioner:Govt
Petitioner:Business
-0.832 0.137 0.342
-(3.892) (2.660) (4.676)
-0.911 -0.248 0.569
-(7.522) -(4.093) (9.554)
Respondent:Business
Respondent:Govt
0.491 -0.774 -0.117
(3.340) -(4.584) -(4.045)
-0.102 -0.434 0.258
-(2.261) -(4.653) (7.314)
Issue:Contracts
Issue:Torts
-0.340 -0.960 -0.344
-(4.655) -(8.660) -(8.456)
-0.124 -0.842 -0.559
-(2.292) -(5.650) -(6.757)
-0.530 0.273 -0.432
-(3.647) (4.339) -(5.980)
-0.005 0.005
-(4.469) (9.000)
Legal:Standing
Justice 
Specific
PAJID
Legal:Evidence
Legal:Discretion
0.009 -0.008
(4.057) -(4.017)
0.298 0.679
(3.159) (6.636)
-0.024 0.004
-(4.906) (5.339)
-0.063 -0.066
-(27.298) -(24.465)
Justice/Case 
Specific
Years of Experience   
in the Court
Judicial Experience
Political Experience
CIT
0.000 0.000
-(1.921) (1.257)
4.358 1.811
(9.671) (6.508)
1.783 0.073
(1.197) (1.534)
-1.209 -2.550
-(3.078) -(7.449)
-0.579 0.033
-(4.739) (1.444)
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis.
Money Slant * 
Termremain
CIT * Termremain
Money Slant
Money Slant * 
ProRespondent
Money Slant (-i)
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Figure 1: Left panel shows the change in justices’ strategies associated with a change in
money slant from zero to the benchmark money slant (left panel). Right panel shows the
decomposition of this change in a direct effect and an equilibrium effect.
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Figure 2: The left panel plots the probability of an incorrect decision at the benchmark
money slant. The right panel shows a comparison with the case of zero contributions.
30
!"#$#%& !'$#%& #$#%& '$#%& "#$#%& "'$#%&
())*+,&
-.//)0&
1++&
23)45&
678)4&
19),+5&
():5;)4&
<):,;&
<))=&
>+44+/3&
!"#$#%#&
?@,+A;&BC+A;& BD:@7@E,@:8&BC+A;&
!F'$#%& !F#$#%& !"'$#%& !"#$#%& !'$#%& #$#%& '$#%& "#$#%& "'$#%& F#$#%&
G,.37),&
H@A;),3&
I)945)4&
-.,A:5&
<):,;&
2+88)4&
<.7)J+,)&
>@8E.77&
'()*+#,#&
?@,+A;&BC+A;& BD:@7@E,@:8&BC+A;&
!"#$#%& !K$#%& !L$#%& !M$#%& !F$#%& #$#%& F$#%& M$#%& L$#%& K$#%& "#$#%& "F$#%&
N,@A=7+3&
O+.P+,&
Q@7+3&
N)37+&
2+P@4&
<):,;&
-.77+R&
<.P.4.J9&
-+./+0#,&
?@,+A;&BC+A;& BD:@7@E,@:8&BC+A;&
!"#$#%& !'$#%& #$#%& '$#%& "#$#%& "'$#%&
G:,4.J+&
Q+J4@+,&
<):,;&
S,.3&
T+75)4&
2+.*9.,;&
(:4;&
G,@+U+@7+,&
-(,1#,#&
?@,+A;&BC+A;& BD:@7@E,@:8&BC+A;&
!"#$#%& !K$#%& !L$#%& !M$#%& !F$#%& #$#%& F$#%& M$#%& L$#%& K$#%& "#$#%&
<))=&
-)3+,&
1;,.R)4&
<):,;&
VW+@W+,&
1U++4+3&
Q+54@A=&
?):J7.5&
2/+(&
?@,+A;&BC+A;& BD:@7@E,@:8&BC+A;&
!L$#%& !M$#%& !F$#%& #$#%& F$#%& M$#%&
1.37),&
T+U8.4&
<.**3&
X7.9+,;3&
Y.**.7.&
<):,;&
<.5Z77+&
T@J,)&
34,,*5"6#,+#&
?@,+A;&BC+A;& BD:@7@E,@:8&BC+A;&
!'$#%& #$#%& '$#%& "#$#%& "'$#%& F#$#%&
[U+4&
S)4\.7+\&
(+A9;&
V9@77@*5&
<):,;&
B4)A9&
6EE)R&
<),434&
N.=+,&
1*+A;),&
748#*&
?@,+A;&BC+A;& BD:@7@E,@:8&BC+A;&
!"#$#%& !K$#%& !L$#%& !M$#%& !F$#%& #$#%& F$#%& M$#%& L$#%&
<,))=5&
O@7A)0&
N,./7+3&
<):,;&
1;+@48+;\&
6E,.9.85)4&
S+5=+&
N.E7@;A9&
9+*.(,*+,&
?@,+A;&BC+A;& BD:@7@E,@:8&BC+A;&
Figure 3: Counterfactual effect on the probability that each justice (and the Court) votes
to overturn when the money slant changes from zero to the benchmark, m1. The total
change is decomposed in a direct effect (blue bars) and an equilibrium effect (red bars).
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Figure 4: Counterfactual effect on the probability that each justice (and the Court) incor-
rectly votes to overturn (blue bars) and uphold (red bars) when the money slant changes
from zero to the benchmark, m1. Line plots the effect on the total probability of a mistake.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Additional Tables
Table 3: Case-Specific Data
Table 4: Justice-Specific Data
mean 36.6 7.5 0.1 2.0 10.6 35.1
st.dev. 12.6 9.2 0.4 1.7 8.9 0.0
min 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 35.1
max 48.6 25.0 1.0 4.5 27.5 35.1
mean 33.6 10.5 0.2 2.4 10.2 35.3
st.dev. 11.5 5.0 0.4 3.0 9.4 0.0
min 7.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 35.3
max 48.6 19.0 1.0 8.5 23.5 35.3
mean 42.9 6.5 0.2 3.0 10.6 52.9
st.dev. 20.0 5.8 0.4 2.9 7.3 0.0
min 25.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 52.9
max 65.9 19.0 1.0 7.5 23.5 52.9
mean 34.0 0.9 0.1 2.1 6.2 37.4
st.dev. 17.7 2.1 0.3 2.5 5.3 0.0
min 21.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.4
max 58.4 6.0 1.0 6.5 15.5 37.4
mean 36.0 7.4 0.1 1.7 8.3 45.6
st.dev. 16.7 7.2 0.3 2.0 6.0 2.6
min 21.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.4
max 56.7 22.0 1.0 5.5 19.5 46.4
mean 49.3 6.8 0.0 2.8 10.3 53.6
st.dev. 17.5 7.5 0.0 3.4 8.2 0.0
min 24.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 53.6
max 63.0 27.0 0.0 8.5 24.5 53.6
mean 27.2 5.0 0.1 0.8 6.7 37.6
st.dev. 11.7 6.2 0.4 1.5 5.0 0.0
min 8.1 0.0 0.0 -0.8 0.3 37.6
max 44.8 22.0 1.0 4.5 17.5 37.6
mean 44.1 7.5 0.4 3.1 13.9 51.0
st.dev. 20.1 7.4 0.5 3.5 10.4 0.0
min 24.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 51.0
max 66.5 19.0 1.0 9.0 32.5 51.0
Wisconsin
Michigan
Montana
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Texas
Years Until Next 
Election (avg. 95-98)
Years of Experience in 
the Court (avg. 95-98) CIT (avg. 95-98)
Alabama
Lousiana
State Justice PAJID Prior Judicial Experience (Y)
Prior Political 
Experience (0/1)
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Table 5: Types and Strategies on Average, Benchmark Money Slant.
Justice
Almon, Reneau P 0.050 0.919 3.046 0.541 0.762 0.591
Cook, Ralph D. 0.282 0.977 2.575 0.224 0.259 0.421
Houston, Gorman  0.056 0.926 3.038 0.524 0.731 0.574
Kennedy, Mark  0.317 0.982 2.585 0.185 0.209 0.388
Maddox, Alva Hugh 0.022 0.897 3.285 0.615 0.883 0.708
Shores, Janie L. 0.047 0.923 3.099 0.540 0.761 0.593
Hooper Sr., Perry O. 0.024 0.817 2.890 0.687 0.912 0.695
Lyons, Champ Jr. 0.072 0.925 2.898 0.504 0.692 0.554
See, Harold F. 0.076 0.917 2.814 0.509 0.700 0.556
Calogero Jr., Pascal F. 0.589 0.994 2.283 -0.098 0.084 0.001
Kimball, Catherine D. 0.730 0.996 2.007 -0.305 0.075 0.002
Lemmon, Harry T. 0.458 0.994 2.597 0.041 0.086 0.001
Marcus Jr., Walter F. 0.143 0.973 2.985 0.357 0.367 0.003
Victory, Jeffrey P. 0.167 0.926 2.413 0.400 0.537 0.003
Johnson, Bernette Joshua 0.170 0.946 2.557 0.373 0.475 0.003
Traylor, Chet D. 0.005 0.741 3.235 0.800 0.980 0.039
Boyle, Patricia J. 0.054 0.889 2.828 0.568 0.755 0.859
Brickley, James H. 0.038 0.833 2.739 0.647 0.844 0.883
Cavanagh, Michael F. 0.216 0.965 2.595 0.303 0.322 0.755
Levin, Charles L. 0.046 0.888 2.906 0.581 0.780 0.868
Mallett Jr., Conrad L. 0.083 0.955 3.074 0.450 0.528 0.783
Riley, Dorothy Comstock 0.064 0.870 2.646 0.575 0.751 0.855
Weaver, Elizabeth Ann 0.077 0.841 2.426 0.588 0.751 0.850
Gray, Karla M. 0.143 0.924 2.499 0.427 0.470 0.068
Hunt Sr., William E. 0.177 0.967 2.767 0.334 0.282 0.053
Leaphart, W William 0.165 0.972 2.883 0.338 0.266 0.049
Nelson, Jim C. 0.083 0.980 3.449 0.402 0.305 0.047
Trieweiler, Terry  0.245 0.953 2.362 0.292 0.304 0.063
Turnage, Jean A. 0.020 0.890 3.282 0.627 0.846 0.179
Regnier, Jim  0.071 0.928 2.927 0.502 0.586 0.084
Cook, Deborah L. 0.029 0.788 2.701 0.704 0.863 0.917
Douglas, Andrew  0.123 0.967 2.998 0.386 0.338 0.776
Moyer, Thomas J. 0.038 0.831 2.729 0.649 0.811 0.904
Pfeifer, Paul E. 0.102 0.937 2.805 0.453 0.496 0.838
Resnick, Alice Robie 0.069 0.900 2.765 0.536 0.652 0.871
Sweeney Sr., Francis E. 0.088 0.886 2.564 0.529 0.632 0.869
Stratton, Evelyn Lundberg 0.061 0.881 2.730 0.568 0.702 0.881
Cappy, Ralph J. 0.043 0.833 2.683 0.640 0.816 0.994
Castille, Ronald D. 0.055 0.853 2.647 0.603 0.769 0.993
Flaherty, John P. 0.033 0.839 2.833 0.650 0.843 0.994
Newman, Sandra Schultz 0.047 0.807 2.547 0.659 0.820 0.994
Zappala, Stephen A. 0.033 0.846 2.865 0.644 0.840 0.994
Nigro, Russell M. 0.061 0.893 2.790 0.555 0.712 0.992
Saylor, Thomas G. 0.038 0.766 2.505 0.711 0.858 0.994
Abbott, Greg  0.333 0.974 2.376 0.182 0.238 0.000
Baker, James A. 0.340 0.974 2.349 0.175 0.239 0.000
Cornyn, John  0.345 0.971 2.292 0.174 0.253 0.000
Enoch, Craig T. 0.296 0.972 2.452 0.219 0.258 0.000
Gonzalez, Raul A. 0.115 0.953 2.877 0.417 0.487 0.000
Hecht, Nathan L. 0.167 0.950 2.614 0.370 0.436 0.000
Owen, Priscilla  0.126 0.942 2.718 0.422 0.513 0.000
Phillips, Thomas R. 0.189 0.959 2.622 0.336 0.379 0.000
Spector, Rose  0.716 0.996 2.063 -0.277 0.064 0.000
Abrahamson,Shirley S.  0.047 0.837 2.652 0.630 0.847 0.992
Bablitch, William A. 0.069 0.978 3.498 0.423 0.463 0.972
Bradley, Ann Walsh 0.055 0.765 2.318 0.689 0.859 0.992
Geske, Janine P. 0.064 0.872 2.660 0.572 0.787 0.991
Steinmetz, Donald W. 0.051 0.836 2.610 0.625 0.838 0.992
Crooks, N. Patrick 0.026 0.742 2.598 0.750 0.923 0.994
Wilcox, John P. 0.031 0.856 2.925 0.637 0.877 0.993
Alabama       
(! =  0.68)
Wisconsin            
(! =  0.69)
Louisiana       
(! =  0.67)
Texas            
(! =  0.65)
Michigan       
(! =  0.64)
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(! =  0.58)
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(! =  0.59)
Pennsylvania            
(! =  0.62)
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Figure 5: Empirical distribution of money slant at the justice/case level and of the justice-
specific average money slant in the benchmark m1.
Table 6: “Second-Stage” Estimates and Standard Errors for Alabama. Case-specific co-
variates at state-specific sample means, non-monetary individual-specific covariates at their
values for the justices sitting in the court, and money slant of each justice at their sample
average in the active benchmark m1.
Justice
Almon, Reneau P 0.050 0.919 3.045 0.541 0.761 0.589
(0.006) (0.006) (0.069) (0.012) (0.021) (0.064)
Cook, Ralph D. 0.282 0.977 2.575 0.224 0.259 0.419
(0.038) (0.003) (0.109) (0.036) (0.070) (0.113)
Houston, Gorman  0.056 0.926 3.038 0.524 0.731 0.572
(0.005) (0.005) (0.059) (0.010) (0.018) (0.063)
Kennedy, Mark  0.317 0.982 2.585 0.184 0.209 0.386
(0.049) (0.003) (0.127) (0.045) (0.083) (0.133)
Maddox, Alva Hugh 0.022 0.897 3.285 0.615 0.883 0.707
(0.005) (0.009) (0.103) (0.015) (0.033) (0.084)
Shores, Janie L. 0.047 0.923 3.099 0.539 0.761 0.591
(0.006) (0.006) (0.539) (0.011) (0.020) (0.063)
Hooper Sr., Perry O. 0.024 0.817 2.891 0.687 0.912 0.694
(0.009) (0.019) (0.175) (0.026) (0.051) (0.137)
Lyons, Champ Jr. 0.072 0.925 2.898 0.503 0.692 0.552
(0.007) (0.005) (0.062) (0.011) (0.019) (0.064)
See, Harold F. 0.076 0.917 2.814 0.508 0.700 0.555
(0.007) (0.006) (0.060) (0.011) (0.018) (0.066)
Prior    =0.68 (0.021)
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7.2 Equilibrium in the Strategic Voting Model
Let µjt : R → [0, 1] denote the strategy of justice j in case t, where µjt(sjt) ≡ Pr(vjt = 1|sjt).
Given cutoff strategies with cutpoints sstit , Pr(vit = 1|ωt) =
∫
µit(s)φ(θit[s−ωt])ds = [1−Φ(θit[sstit−
ωt])]. Therefore, letting Ci(n−1)/2 denote the set of coalitions C ⊂ N \ i with (n− 1)/2 members,
{sstit}ni=1 is given by the n equations
∑
C∈C(n−1)/2
(∏
j∈C [1− Φ(θjt[sstjt − 1])]
)(∏
j 6=i,j /∈C Φ(θjt[s
st
jt − 1])
)
∑
C∈C(n−1)/2
(∏
j∈C [1− Φ(θjtsstjt)]
)(∏
j 6=i,j /∈C Φ(θjts
st
jt)
) φ(θit[sstit − 1])
φ(θitsstit )
=
piit
1− piit
1− ρt
ρt
(3)
7.3 Estimation
As the discussion in Section 3 shows, the equilibrium voting behavior of the justices is completely
characterized by the cutpoints: {sstit} for the strategic model, and {sexpit } for the expressive voting
model. Given the cutpoints, we can write the likelihood of the justices’ votes in case t as
Pr(vt) ≡
∑
ωt
Pr(ωt)
n∏
i=1
[1− Φ(θit[smit − ωt])]vitΦ(θit[smit − ωt])1−vit , m ∈ {exp, ST} . (4)
The likelihood functions for the expressive and the strategic models are almost identical, except
for the cutoff points: sexp for the expressive model, and sst for the strategic model.23
Our estimation procedure has two parts, which we describe in order.
Estimation: First step. We introduce the following notation:
Priors: ρ ≡ Pr(ωt = 1) Voting Probs.: γi,1 ≡ Pr(vit = 1|ωt = 1)
1− ρ = Pr(ωt = 0) γi,0 ≡ Pr(vit = 1|ωt = 0)
Our empirical model accommodates case-level heterogeneity by allowing the reduced-form
parameters of the model – which are recovered in the first step of the estimation procedure –
to depend quite flexibly on observable characteristics Xt. Specifically, we parameterize justices’
priors in case t, ρt ≡ Pr(ωt = 1), as a logit probability which depends on the characteristics Xt:
ρ(Xt;β) ≡ exp(X
′
tβ)
1 + exp(X ′tβ)
, ∈ [0, 1].
23We argued that any equilibrium in the expressive and strategic voting models must be in cutoff strate-
gies. In the strategic voting model, however, it is possible that equilibrium is not unique; i.e., that given a
prior ρ and types (θi, pii) for i = 1, . . . , n, there is more than one vector of cutpoints s
st solving (3). Here
we assume that if there are multiple equilibria, justices consistently play the same equilibrium whenever
the characteristics of the problem are unchanged. It should be noted, however, that in the estimation,
for any vector of conditional voting probabilities in the first stage (see Section 7.3), we recover the types
(θi, pii) uniquely.
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Because the prior probability ρt varies across cases, so will the equilibrium strategies s
∗
it, and
hence so will the justice-specific conditional probabilities of voting to overturn γit,1 and γit,0.
Accordingly, we also parameterize these probabilities to depend upon Xt (covariates for case t)
and Zi (covariates for justice i) in the following way, which also restricts γi,t,1 ≥ γi,t,0, for all Xt:
γi,0(ζ, η) =
exp(Z ′iζ +X
′
tη)
1 + exp(Z ′iζ +X
′
tη)
, ∈ [0, 1];
γi,1(ζ, η, α, δ) =
γi,0 + exp(Z
′
iα+X
′
tδ)
1 + exp(Z ′iα+X
′
tδ)
, ∈ [γi,0(ζ, η), 1].
(5)
In the first stage, we estimate the parameters (β, δ, η) as well as the justice-specific variables (αi, ζi)
for i = 1, . . . , n. For this, we maximize the following likelihood function, which corresponds to
the reduced-form likelihood function for bids in both the expressive and strategic voting models:
max
α,β,ζ,η,δ
∑
t
log
[
ρ(Xt;β) ·
n∏
i=1
{
γi,1(ζ, η, α, δ)
vit(1− γi,1(ζ, η, α, δ))1−vit
}
+(1− ρ(Xt;β)) ·
n∏
i=1
{
γi,0(ζ, η)
vit(1− γi,0(ζ, η))1−vit
}]
.
(6)
Given the MLE estimates of ζˆ, ηˆ, αˆ, δˆ, we can compute the corresponding priors ρˆ ≡ ρ(Xt, βˆ) as
well as vote probabilities γˆi,0 ≡ γi,0(ζˆ, ηˆ) and γˆi,1 ≡ γi,1(ζˆ, ηˆ, αˆ, βˆ) for any vector of covariates
(Xt, Zt).
Second step. Using the estimates of the two justice-specific vote probabilities γˆi,1 and γˆi,0,
from the first step, we recover the equilibrium strategies and the two structural parameters, pii
and θi, for each justice i. Recall our earlier assumptions that justice i’s private information is
sit = ωt+
1
θi
εit, with εit ∼ N (0, 1). Then γi,1 ≡ 1−Φ (θi[s∗i − 1])) and γi,0 ≡ (1−Φ(θis∗i )). Solving
these equations for θi and s
∗
i given γˆi,1 and γˆi,0 (and substituting Φ
−1(γi,1) = −Φ−1(1 − γi,1))
gives24
θˆi = Φ
−1(1− γˆi,0)− Φ−1(1− γˆi,1); sˆi = Φ
−1(1− γˆi,0)
Φ−1(1− γˆi,0) + Φ−1(γˆi,1) (7)
In order to recover the bias parameter pii, we use the equilibrium voting condition, which
differs between the expressive and strategic models. In the case of the expressive voting model,
this is given by
φ(θi[sˆi − 1])
φ(θisˆi)
=
pˆiexpi
1− pˆiexpi
1− ρˆ
ρˆ
, (8)
while in the strategic voting model this is given by the system of equations (3). For both models,
plugging in our estimates of θi and sˆi into the appropriate equilibrium condition allows us to
24Note that the estimate of i’s information quality is increasing in the probability of correctly voting to
overturn, γi,1, and decreasing in the probability of incorrectly voting to overturn, γi,0. The estimate of the
equilibrium cutpoint, instead, is a decreasing function of the ratio between Φ−1(γˆi,1) and Φ−1(1 − γˆi,0).
Thus sˆi is (roughly) decreasing in the ratio of the probability of correctly voting to overturn (γi,1) relative
to the probability of correctly voting to uphold (1− γi,0).
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recover estimates of pˆiexpi and pˆi
st
i for the expressive and strategic models, respectively. Note that,
when the voting probabilities γi.0 and γi,1 are case-specific and depend on the covariates X and
Z, then so will the model parameters θ and pi.
Note that, in recovering θi, it was not necessary to specify whether justices vote expressively or
strategically. An assumption regarding strategic or expressive voting is required only for recovering
pii. This distinction between θi and pii is a remarkable property of this problem. It implies that
the precision estimate is independent of whether justices care about the court ruling or about
their own vote being correct, and therefore of whether justices use the information contained in
the event of them being pivotal or simply best respond to their own private information.25
7.4 The Environment of Judicial Decisions
The analysis in the paper focused on how contributions affect the characteristics and voting
behavior of the supreme court justices serving in the court. Money, however, is only one of
several factors influencing the types and voting behavior of members of the court. The goal of
this section is to put the effect of money in perspective, relating it to the changes caused by other,
non-monetary factors. In particular, we focus here on two factors: (i) differences in preferences
across voters, and (ii) justices’ experience in the court, and discuss other factors summarily.
Voters’ Characteristics. In the econometric model, we allow justices’ types and voting be-
havior to vary with voters’ characteristics. Here we employ the measure of citizen ideology (CIT)
proposed by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998). The first-stage estimates for the
coefficients ζC2 and α
C
2 of CIT in the conditional voting probabilities γ0 and γ1 are negative and
statistically significant (Table 6). The estimates ζC2 = −0.063(0.002) ≈ αC2 = −0.066(0.003) < 0
suggest that CIT predominantly affects justices’ bias (though not entirely, because of the nonlin-
earity in the specification). Figure 4 illustrates the magnitude of the effect of CIT on justices’ bias
and quality of information. The horizontal axis represents the counterfactual bias of individual
justices in all eight states when facing the voters of the most conservative state in the sample
(Montana), as measured by the CIT variable. The vertical axis represents the change in bias
corresponding to a change in CIT to the level of a moderate state (Alabama) and to the level of
the most liberal state (Pennsylvania).
25 See Iaryczower and Shum (2011) and Iaryczower, Lewis, and Shum (2011) for a discussion of parameter
identification for our model.
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Figure 6: The left panel plots individual justices’ bias when CIT is fixed at the levels of the most
conservative state in the sample (Montana) in the horizontal axis, and the corresponding change in bias
when CIT is fixed at the level of that of voters in the centrist state in the sample (Alabama) and the most
liberal state in the sample (Pennsylvania). The right panel shows the corresponding figure for quality of
information.
The results show a very significant change in bias in response to these changes in CIT. Chang-
ing from the voters in the most conservative state (Montana) to the voters of the intermediate
liberal/conservative state (Alabama) increases the bias towards upholding by an average of 0.21.
The change in bias peaks at about ∆pi ≈ 0.3 for initial bias levels pi ∈ [0.2, 0.4]. Thus, a justice
that would have overturned a decision of the lower court when facing Montana voters if the prob-
ability that the Petitioner is correct was at least 30% would require a probability of at least 60
% to overturn when facing the more moderate Alabama voters. Changing from the voters in the
most conservative state (Montana) to the voters of the most liberal state (Pennsylvania) increases
the pro-upholding bias by an average of 0.48. The change in bias peaks at about ∆pi ≈ 0.6 for
initial bias levels pi ∈ [0.1, 0.3]. Thus, a justice that would have overturned when facing Montana
voters if the probability that the Petitioner is correct is at least 20% would require a probability of
at least 80 % to overturn when facing the more liberal Pennsylvania voters. To put these results
in perspective, eliminating the money slant in the benchmark increases pi by 0.20 or more for only
10% of justices, and increases pi by 0.22 or more for only 5% of justices.
Experience. In the econometric model, we allow justices’ types and voting behavior to vary
with their prior judicial experience, and their experience in the court. The coefficient estimates for
the experience variables are statistically significant, but the magnitude of the estimates is small
compared to the effect of the money slant. Additional years of experience in the court have a small
but positive effect on quality of information and a negligible effect on bias: increasing experience in
the court from zero to ten years increases the average quality of information between 0.12 and 0.13
for 90% of justices, and changes the bias of 90% of justices between 0.014 and 0.036. Additional
years of prior judicial experience have a small but negative effect on quality of information, and
a negligible effect on bias: increasing prior judicial experience from zero to ten years reduces the
average quality of information between -0.08 and -0.07 for 90% of justices, and changes the bias
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of 90% of justices between -0.004 and 0.002.
Substantive Issues. Justices decide disputes on different types of cases, including differences
in both substantive and legal issues. Within substantive issue areas, we distinguish between
civil government, contracts and torts cases. Outcomes are statistically significantly different
across issue areas, although the differences are not always large in magnitude. First, the prior
probability that the decision of the lower court should be overturned is about 0.6 in both civil
government cases and torts, but is significantly larger (0.73) in contracts. Justices biases are
basically unchanged between torts and civil government cases (for 90% of justices, the difference
in bias is between -0.012 and 0.016), but most justices become more pro-defendant in contracts
cases: 90% of justices’ bias increase between 0.097 and 0.267, and for more than 50 % of justices,
bias increases more than 0.2. Quality of information is substantially larger in both contracts and
torts cases, compared to civil government cases. For 90% of justices, the change in quality of
information in contracts (tort) cases vis a vis civil government is between 0.245 and 0.317 (0.302
and 0.326).
Legal Issues. Outcomes also vary significantly with differences in legal issues across cases.
Comparing with the base category, the average quality of information in cases involving issues
of legal discretion is between 0.19 and 0.32 points larger than in the base legal class for 90%
of individuals, but only between 0.02 and 0.17 points larger for issues of evidence, and between
-0.36 and -0.29 smaller for issues of legal standing. Similarly, judges are less inclined to reverse
the decision of lower court when considering legal issues of evidence and discretion than in issues
of legal standing. Comparing with the base category, the average bias in cases involving issues
of legal discretion is between 0.05 and 0.15 points larger than in the base legal class for 90% of
individuals, and between 0.07 and 0.22 points larger for issues of evidence, but between -0.10 and
0.04 points smaller for issues of legal standing.
Type of Parties to the Case. The identity of the parties involved in a case summarizes
relevant information about the details of the legal disputes. In tort cases, for example, individuals
will tend to bring forward different legal arguments than businesses or a government. Businesses,
governments and individuals might also on average differ in the quality of the legal representation,
or on the side of the substantive issue they take in each case. To capture these differences, in
the specification we distinguish Business and Governments from other types of petitioners and
respondents, including individuals, schools, and other organizations. To summarize the results, we
fix the respondent at the individuals category, and change the type of petitioner from individuals
to government and business. The results suggest that all else equal, on average justices are more
inclined to favor businesses over government, and government over individuals. In fact, when we
consider a government (business) petitioner instead of an individual, 90% of justices are more
inclined to overturn, with a change in the bias parameter of between 0.21 and 0.51 (between 0.056
and 0.17 for Business), and 50% of justices have a change in bias of at least 0.40 (0.08). At the
same time, the prior that the decision of the lower court should be overturned is lower when the
petitioner is Government (0.70) or Business (0.71), instead of an individual (0.75).26
26When we fix the petitioner as an individual and change the type of respondent from individual to
government and business, on average bias also changes towards the petitioner. This is counterintuitive.
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7.5 “Narrow” IG Classification.
In the paper we study the effect on a justice’s characteristics and voting behavior of the aggregate
contributions of the group of individuals and organizations sharing a preferred legal position of
the court on a given issue. In our main results, we define these interest groups using a broad
classification, distinguishing contributions from business, unions, (non-corporate) lawyers, and
education organizations. We have also considered a more narrow classification of interest groups,
in which we distinguish among different business sectors. To do this, we begin assigning contri-
butions to groups according to the detailed original coding of the National Institute of Money in
State Politics.27 We then further aggregate these initial classes into a broader sector classifica-
tion. The next table lists the interest groups defined in this way, and the total contributions per
group. Table 8 presents the first-stage estimates of our model, using the narrow interest group
classification. The table shows that all our main results are qualitatively unchanged.
Contributions
"Narrow" Lobby 1995 1996 1997 1998
ACCOUNTANT 117708 128860 147960 168985
AGRICULTURE 177833 340229 358354 440269
AUTO 124967 238172 268972 426723
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 322984 844440 914990 1348005
CHEMICAL 86941 150088 184473 247651
CONSTRUCTION 274134 535883 640893 821673
EDUCATION 109932 133394 144169 156934
ELECTRONICS 47815 57689 77914 85539
ENTERTAINMENT 19400 23757 39707 53789
FINANCE 520620 796828 912678 1105330
FOOD 153058 210943 240393 297368
HEALTHCARE 96333 146850 165802 198752
HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONAL 502663 774633 828273 971441
INSURANCE 393887 530587 592838 731349
LAWYERS 8524457 10811613 11822418 13349244
MACHINERY 86357 142957 190377 247317
OIL/MINING 475288 724547 814863 972412
PHARMACEUTICAL 58900 65950 73510 84610
REAL ESTATE 325252 456525 528156 653223
RESTAURANTS 18800 61172 65422 82755
RETAIL 62048 141898 155958 220954
TEXTILES 16950 30950 38450 45075
TOBACCO 15415 29265 31340 37252
TRANSPORTATION 68818 107208 130258 161008
UNION 595187 755586 768436 860191
UTILITIES 136844 152151 201751 253051
UNMATCHED.CASE.DATABASE 11123442 15586438 16749501 18857162
Grand Total 24456033 33978612 37087855 42878061
Contributions
"Broad" Lobby 1995 1996 1997 1998
BUSINESS 4638624 7414927 8417545 10637735
EDUCATION 109932 133394 144169 156934
LAWYERS 8524457 10811613 11822418 13349244
UNION 595187 755586 768436 860191
UNMATCHED.CASE.DATABASE 10587832 14863092 15935288 17873957
Grand Total 24456033 33978612 37087855 42878061
Table 7: “Narrow” Interest Group Coding
On the other hand, the prior probability that the petitioner is right changes from 0.75 to 0.55 when the
respondent is Government and 0.57 when the respondent is Business.
27See http://www.followthemoney.org/Institute/about data.phtml.
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Table 8: Narrow Interest Group Coding: Coefficients of the common prior function ρ(Xt),
and the individual state-contingent probabilities of voting to overturn the decision of the
lower court, γ0(Xt, Zit) and γ1(Xt, Zit).
1.781 1.692 5.279
(9.780) (8.224) (19.003)
Case 
Specific
Constant
-0.630 -0.106 -0.556
-(3.831) -(1.682) -(6.842)
Appeal
-0.281 1.271 0.903
-(1.711) (11.929) (6.310)
-0.299 0.539 0.230
-(1.848) (4.356) (2.284)
Petitioner:Govt
Petitioner:Business
-0.399 -0.837 -0.095
-(1.842) -(5.019) -(1.320)
-0.899 -0.349 0.531
-(5.325) -(3.235) (5.680)
Respondent:Business
Respondent:Govt
0.238 0.178 0.271
(1.339) (1.509) (2.650)
-0.198 -0.020 0.444
-(1.188) -(0.375) (4.796)
Issue:Contracts
Issue:Torts
-0.356 -0.845 -0.355
-(2.510) -(7.391) -(4.417)
0.108 -1.493 -0.723
(0.778) -(4.856) -(7.393)
-0.414 0.062 -0.556
-(2.374) (0.872) -(5.793)
-0.012 0.009
-(3.166) (4.049)
Legal:Standing
Justice 
Specific
PAJID
Legal:Evidence
Legal:Discretion
-0.006 -0.010
-(1.499) -(2.505)
0.083 0.750
(0.812) (3.635)
-0.019 -0.001
-(2.275) -(1.139)
-0.073 -0.075
-(12.374) -(12.637)
Justice/Case 
Specific
Years of Experience   
in the Court
Judicial Experience
Political Experience
CIT
-0.001 0.000
-(1.674) (0.986)
2.666 3.319
(2.058) (2.959)
4.778 -0.973
(1.102) -(1.010)
-2.265 -3.908
-(1.742) -(4.710)
-0.165 -0.256
-(0.517) -(1.077)
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis.
Contributions * 
termremain
CIT * termremain
Contributions
Contributions * 
ProRespondent
Contributions(-i)
! 
"
! 
" it0
! 
" it1
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